There are few things more dignifying than when a towering public figure extends the courtesy of respect wrapped in humility. General Lucky Irabor, former Chief of Defence Staff, exemplifies that rare blend of strength and grace. When he invited me to the presentation of his new book, “SCARS: Nigerias Journey and the Boko Haram Conundrum,” I was reminded that behind the imposing military uniform lies a man of reflection, intellect, and empathy unless, of course, one dares to cross the line.

This quality stands in sharp contrast to the arrogance I have encountered at a strategic institute where a few officers inflated egos left little room for courtesy or intellectual exchange.

I could not attend the book launch due to a scheduling conflict with the International Public Relations Associations (IPRA) Golden World Awards in Ghana, where both the Nigeria Customs Service and my organisation, Image Merchants Promotion Limited (IMPR), were being honoured. On my return to Abuja, all copies of the book had sold out at the designated bookshops, and I was due to travel to Canada that same night. Learning of my predicament, General Irabor personally ensured a copy was sent to me a gesture that spoke volumes about his character.

Taking the advice of his friend, Vice President Kashim Shettima, that to truly enjoy a book, read it on a long journey, I opened it mid-flight and did not stop until I reached the last page. In less than twenty-four hours, I devoured the 300-page memoir a deeply analytical, well-researched, and intellectually stimulating work that goes far beyond the typical autobiographical recount of a retired general.

Irabors SCARS stands out for its narrative style. It is not a self-indulgent memoir but a reflective chronicle that blends personal experience with historical analysis and policy critique. He writes with academic precision, referencing other scholars, field experiences, and verifiable data. Between the lines, the discerning reader can sense his measured but firm convictions on the Boko Haram insurgency, Niger Delta militancy, IPOB separatism, Yoruba nationalism, and the societal decay that has haunted Nigeria since independence.

The book is a panoramic chronicle from the civil war and military coups to democratic transitions and insurgencies offering a sober reflection on the choices and failures that have defined Nigerias evolution. Notably, Irabor avoids sensationalism or name-dropping; even his acknowledgments are strikingly modest despite the calibre of personalities including former Presidents who later attended the unveiling in Abuja.

Former President Olusegun Obasanjo, in his foreword, aptly describes the book as a soldiers honest reflection on a nations unfinished journey. But the true revelations lie within the pages in Irabors unflinching interrogation of Nigerias political and moral contradictions.

Among the books most intriguing points is his assertion that no full-fledged coup dtat in Nigeria has ever occurred without civilian collaboration. He argues that soldiers, bound by their oath of allegiance, often justify interventions through the prism of national defence. This interpretation shifts part of the blame for Nigerias military incursions to opportunistic civilians who manipulate or enable such actions for personal gain.

Equally provocative is his historical framing of Northern Nigerias recurring religious conflicts. Irabor traces their roots to Usman Dan Fodios jihad of 1804, viewing it as the starting point of organized religious militancy in the region. While this perspective is historically grounded, it risks oversimplification. Thankfully, Irabor tempers his argument by contextualizing it within the broader millenarian revolts of early colonialism, suggesting that both Islamic revivalism and Christian evangelism during the colonial era contributed to shaping Nigerias spiritual and social divides.

One area readers may find conspicuously absent is any mention of the tragic death of gallant General Ibrahim Attahiru, the late Chief of Army Staff who perished in a plane crash shortly after Boko Harams leader, Abubakar Shekau, was reportedly killed. Given Irabors position as the CDS, his silence on the matter is perhaps deliberate an act of discretion from a professional soldier who values institutional continuity over personal disclosure.

Still, his candour shines through elsewhere. The sections on Northern Nigerias political elite are unambiguously critical. Irabor faults the regions leaders for presiding over deepening poverty, illiteracy, and insecurity despite their educational exposure and political dominance. He cites World Bank data showing that the ten poorest states in Nigeria are all in the North-East and North-West, with 87% of the nations poorest population concentrated there. He attributes this grim reality to elite hypocrisy, religious manipulation, and the failure to translate political power into social progress.

He particularly denounces the politicisation of religion, using the Sharia Movement in Zamfara (1999) as a case study of how political opportunism derailed governance. Quoting Emir Sanusi Lamido Sanusi, Irabor laments the commodification of piety a process through which religion becomes a tool of control rather than a vehicle for moral upliftment.

He calls on Northern leaders to emulate progressive Muslim societies like Saudi Arabia and Turkey, which have harmonised faith with modernity rather than allowing religion to justify stagnation. His position on the Almajiri system is particularly powerful; he argues that no faith sanctions the institutionalisation of street begging or the abandonment of children in the name of learning.

The chapter on the Dead Horse Theory is one of the books most intellectually stimulating sections. Here, Irabor uses the metaphor to describe Nigerias tendency to keep beating dead horses sustaining failed policies and obsolete institutions instead of pursuing meaningful reform. He cites the duplication of examination bodies like WAEC and NECO, the Nomadic Education Programme, and the regional cut-off mark policy as examples of how Nigeria perpetuates inefficiency under the guise of inclusiveness.

The discussion on Boko Haram is both historical and diagnostic. Irabor situates the insurgency within a continuum of religious and socio-political crises, from the Maitatsine riots of the 1980s to the Sharia clashes of 19992000. He chronicles how Mohammed Yusuf, the sects founder, began as a member of Bornos Sharia Implementation Committee, only to break away and radicalise disillusioned youth by preaching against Western education and government corruption. The book exposes the irony of Boko Harams dependence on Western technology weapons, communication tools, and propaganda platforms even while denouncing Western civilisation.

Irabor portrays Boko Haram not as a purely religious movement but as a symptom of governance failure, economic deprivation, and elite negligence. He identifies the drivers of extremism as unaddressed political grievances, weaponisation of religion and tribe, a biased legal framework, and weakened institutions.

The author also voices deep concern over what he described as an international conspiracy against Nigeria, singling out certain foreign entities and media organisations. He accuses them of not only supplying logistical support to terrorist groups but also of deliberately spreading false narratives aimed at discrediting the Nigerian military and destabilising national security.

In his closing reflections, the General offers a pragmatic pathway forward: diplomatic negotiation, socioeconomic and political realignment, and governance reforms that reward merit and restore trust. The time for change is now, he writes, and it must begin with truth, inclusion, and a commitment to genuine progress.

SCARS is not just a memoir; it is a mirror reflecting Nigerias wounds the scars of war, hypocrisy, and wasted potential. Irabors writing is measured but fearless, scholarly yet deeply human. His critique of the North is not an attack but a plea for introspection; his assessment of Nigerias leadership failures is not cynical but reformist.

This book is an essential read for anyone seeking to understand Nigerias enduring crises from insurgency and leadership to the complex interplay between faith, politics, and national identity.

General Lucky Irabors SCARS leaves readers not with despair, but with hope the hope that confronting our scars honestly is the first step toward national healing.

Yushau A. Shuaib is the author of An Encounter with the Spymaster and Award-Winning Crisis Communication Strategies. yashuaib@yashuaib.com

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On Tuesday, 9th August 2022, senior editors and top journalists attended a media parley with the then Chief of Defence Staff, General Lucky Irabor.

The previous month, devastating terrorist activities were widely reported in the media, including attacks on St. Francis Catholic Church in Owo, Ondo State; assault on the presidential convoy in Katsina State; invasion of the Kuje Prison in Abuja; the deadly ambush of senior Police officers; and the alleged killing of civilians as collateral damage of military operations.

The CDS used the opportunity to solicit the cooperation of the larger society, through the media, saying that, the criminals (terrorists) want to stoke fear and to promote resentment to such a level that every one of us will not even want to leave our houses. This is the strategy, which if we do not take time, will become part and parcel of our daily lives.

In my presentation on Media Analysis of Defence Security Sector Coverage and Fact-checking Conflict-sensitive Reporting as the Guest Speaker, I pointed out clearly that while a lot of media reported scenes accurately others not only exaggerated but published obviously one-sided reports without reflecting other realities on the ground, as well as evident security sector accomplishments.

I also alluded to the fact that some media organisations do not question the authenticity of statements from terrorists in their reporting, while yet casting headlines that doubt official sources and which are framed in cynical ways, such as: Military claims.. or Unconfirmed reports on troops victory,” etc.

The then Director of Defence Information, Major General Jimmy Akpor urged the editors to remain partners in progress with the Armed Forces, by ensuring that their media organisations were insulated from being used by terrorists to unintentionally fuel fear in the minds of Nigerians.

Barrister Charles Odenigbo of The Media Today International (TMT), the facilitator of the session, said that the media parley with the CDS was planned in the spirit of openness, in order to elicit a practical and robust review of media reportage of the defence and security sector. He urged the media to continue to work with the military in the task of national security and nation-building.

It was quite gratifying at the meeting that the spokesperson of the Nigerian Airforce (NAF), Air Commodore Edward Gabkwet led the session that showed declassified video footage of airstrikes on camps and hideouts of bandits and terrorists across the country.

Most of the editors at the briefing marvelled at how Nigerian troops had eliminated scores of fleeing terrorists, especially following the rather daring attacks on the presidential convoy and the ambush that led to the death of Assistant Commissioner of Police Aminu Inuwa in Katsina, among other similar operations revealed in the shown footages.

The media parley with General Irabor was conceptualised as a way of building sustainable trust and confidence in military-media relations, towards pursuing the common causes of freedom, liberty and national security.

Immediately after the engagement, a senior editor had jokingly asked the then Chief of Defence Intelligence, Major General Samuel Adebayo, who also contributed at the event, if the media parley was another form of psychological operation.

Adebayo, a typical spymaster who would rather have wished to remain unseen, if not also unheard, calmly responded that Psychological Operations (Psyops) or Psychological Warfare (PSYWAR) are mostly unannounced but noticed or felt. He added that when deployed, these approaches are generally targeted at winning the hearts and minds of specific audiences on the field and not trained on the media as reliable partners of the military.

Beyond combat operations in creating a security bulwark for Nigeria, CDS Irabor is remarkably noted for the result-driven way in which he had piloted the affairs of the military in building synergies, partnerships and collaborations across the military services and relevant stakeholders.

During the earlier short-lived tenure of the late Army Chief, Lt. General Attahiru, the Nigerian Army, as the lead agency on counterterrorism operations in the country, was very visible in the media in terms of profiling the efforts and accomplishments of the troops, before he unfortunately lost his life in a plane crash only a few weeks after the death of the most wanted Boko Haram leader, Abubakar Shekau.

The immediate past Chief of Army Staff, Lt. General Faruk Yahya; the former Chief of Air Staff, Air Marshal Isiaka Amao; and the previous Chief of Naval Staff, Vice Admiral Awwal Zubairu Gambo all gave fillip to the countrys joint counter-insurgency operations, the updates of which were centralised under the Directorate of Military Operation (DMO). The Directorate of Defence Information (DDI) retained its conventional focus on the routine events around Defence Headquarters.

Nevertheless, the Service Chiefs concentrated their media interface on the publicity around ceremonial outings, civil-military relations (CMR) commitments, and corporate social responsibility (CSR) efforts. Some of them occasionally facilitated third-party media narratives that enabled accurate, unbiased and responsible reports.

The soft approach programmes of the Service Chiefs were largely in the realm of psychological operations (Psyops) that ensured safety, built community trust and engendered peacebuilding. The Psyops were aimed at influencing the state of mind of target audiences through non-combative means such as the effective deployment of selective messages, messengers, mediums and also the measurement of impacts.

Circumstances that led to the death of Boko Haram leader Shekau, the surrender of over 50,000 Boko Haram members, alongside the rescue and release of abducted citizens, among others, were mostly undertaken through psychological operations.

Apart from the surrender of repentant terrorists and bandits, agreements were also signed with previously undesirable elements to guarantee peace and development in insurgency-prone axes. It was only recently revealed that the cessation of abduction incidents and other violent crimes perpetrated by terrorist groups on the Abuja-Kaduna highway was due to the efforts of a security panel raised by the immediate-past CDS.

Although insecurity is yet to be over in the country, the recently appointed National Security Adviser, Mallam Nuhu Ribadu and the new Service Chiefs would very likely deploy newer forms of kinetic and non-kinetic approaches to address the challenges across the various flashpoints and areas.

The new Chief of Defence Staff, Major General Chris Musa, and the Chief of Army Staff, Major General Taoreed Lagbaja, have demonstrated unique leadership skills in the recent past both as the Theatre Commander in North-East and the General Officer Commanding the Army Division in Kaduna, Northwest Nigeria, respectively. While one ensured the surrender of thousands of repentant terrorists, the other led troops to the field to eliminate bandits.

It is hoped that the new Chief of Naval Staff, Rear Admiral E. A Ogalla; the Chief of Air Staff, Air Vice Marshal Hassan Bala Abubakar; and the Chief of Defence Intelligence, Major General EPA Undiandeye will join efforts in bridging the usual fragmentation among the services and relevant stakeholders in joint force operations, by sustaining the holistic and collaborative mechanism presently being put in place.

The Forum of Spokespersons of Security and Response Agencies (FOSSRA) whose secretariat is at the Centre for Crisis Communication (CCC) also needs to be reactivated towards enabling unified information-sharing processes and procedures, while keeping the public adequately educated and informed.

To a reasonable extent, the immediate service chiefs could be considered as the most cooperative so far, making them accomplish highly significant national security tasks through inter-agency collaborations and synergy in combat operations and strategic communication.

Very importantly, the well-lauded successes attained by General Irabor and the Service Chief under the Muhammadu Buhari administration was the deft utilisation of psychological operations that did not involve killings and death, but which still led to huge numbers of those who got rescued from the vice-grip of insurgents and bandits, while many terrorists and other social deviants were convinced to repent and surrender, before being admitted into rehabilitation programmes. Their joint legacies would rest on this more enduring approach to military strategy and security operations.

Yushau A. Shuaib is the author of An Encounter with the Spymaster and Crisis Communication Strategies. www.YAShuaib.com, yashuaib@yahoo.com

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